Falsity And The FCA: The First Circuit's Blackstone And Amgen Decisions (Part I)

The False Claims Act does not define what types of claims are “false.” Consequently, one of the key battles at the motion to dismiss stage in FCA litigation is whether the conduct alleged by the plaintiff can give rise to a “false” claim as a matter of law. For the past decade, courts addressing this issue have held that the FCA recognizes two categories of actionable false claims – factually false claims and legally false claims. Courts have also recognized that there are at least two subcategories of legally false claims – express certification claims and implied certification claims. A factually false claim is one that involves an incorrect description of goods or services provided or a request for reimbursement for goods or services never provided. A legally false claim is one that is not factually false (i.e., not false on its face), but is false for an extrinsic legal, regulatory or contractual reason; for example, by incorrectly certifying compliance (either expressly or impliedly) with a statute, regulation, or contractual obligation that is a prerequisite to government payment.

In a pair of recent cases, the First Circuit held that this categorical framework for determining falsity is too restrictive and rejected it. See United States ex rel. Hutcheson et al. v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., 2011 WL 2150191 (1st Cir. June 1, 2011); New York ex rel. Westmoreland et al. v. Amgen, Inc. et al., 2011 WL 2937420 (1st Cir. July 22, 2011). In doing so, the First Circuit observed that “[t]he text of the FCA does not refer to ‘factually false’ or ‘legally false’ claims, nor does it refer to ‘express certification’ or ‘implied certification.” Blackstone, at *7. The First Circuit reasoned that “[j]udicially-created categories sometimes can help carry out a statute’s requirements, but they can also create artificial barriers that obscure and distort those requirements.” Blackstone, at *7. According to the First Circuit, “in enacting the FCA, ‘Congress wrote expansively, meaning to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the Government.’” Blackstone, at *12. 

In the First Circuit’s view, the appropriate test to determine falsity under the FCA is a “fact-intensive” and “context-specific” inquiry into whether the claims presented to the government misrepresented that there had been compliance with a material precondition of payment recognized by the particular government program at issue. Amgen, at *6; Blackstone at *13.  In Blackstone, which involved the federal FCA, the First Circuit applied this new falsity test to claims allegedly tainted by kickbacks under the federal Medicare program. In Amgen, which involved analogous state FCAs in New York, Massachusetts, California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, and New Mexico, the First Circuit applied the new test to allegedly kickback tainted claims under the state Medicaid programs in those seven states.

This week, we are publishing a series a posts discussing the First Circuit’s recent Blackstone and Amgen decisions. Parts II and III will examine the application of the First Circuit’s new falsity test to the claims at issue in the Blackstone and Amgen cases. Part IV will explore the potential consequences of the First Circuit’s new falsity test and will suggest measures companies may want to consider to minimize FCA exposure. Part V will discuss why, and how, the U.S. Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split created by the First Circuit.

New Initiative To Lead To Increased Investigations Under The New York FCA

Earlier today, newly elected New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman announced a two-part initiative that he claims will lead to increased investigations under the New York False Claims Act. Specifically, Attorney General Schneiderman announced:

1. The New York AG's office will establish a New Taxpayer Protection Unit to investigate large scale tax fraud and government contracting fraud. (The federal FCA specifically exempts tax fraud claims. In August 2010, New York became the first state to permit actions for tax fraud under its state False Claims Act.) The new unit will also encourage and work with whistleblowers who make allegations of fraud and abuse perpetrated against the government.

2. The New York AG's office will bolster its Medicaid Fraud Control Unit by adding dozens of new prosecutors, investigators, and auditors to investigate allegations of Medicaid fraud.

A copy of the press release issued by Attorney General Schneiderman can be found here.
 

Calfornia Court Dismisses State FCA Case Alleging Reverse False Claims By Bank

On January 11, 2011, in State of California ex rel. Joseph McCann et al. v. Bank of America, N.A. et al, a California Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court’s dismissal of an action under the California False Claims Act based on Bank of America’s alleged failure to return to the State credits resulting from processing errors in Bank of America’s check clearing operations located in San Francisco and Los Angeles. The relators, former employees of Bank of America, claimed that Bank of America collected these credits, held them for a short period of time, and then appropriated the credits as income. Relators claimed that such credits qualified as unclaimed property under the California Unclaimed Property law and that failure to turn over the unclaimed property to the State amounted to a reverse false claim under the California False Claims Act. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that relators had failed to plead their claims with specificity, the unclaimed credits were not unclaimed property under the California Unclaimed Property Law, and there was no false claim because even if there was an obligation to the State of California, that obligation was not liquidated and certain.

Indiana False Claims Act Suit Filed Against 78 State Prosecutors

On November 19, 2010, a qui tam complaint was unsealed against 78 Indiana prosecutors alleging violations of the Indiana False Claims Act. The complaint alleges that the prosecutors violated the Indiana FCA by failing to pay into the Indiana common school fund the net proceeds of criminal forfeiture actions.

Indiana’s criminal forfeiture law, codified at Indiana Code section 34-24-1-4, requires that the proceeds of forfeiture actions after deducting “law enforcement costs” must be turned over to the common school fund, which makes loans to Indiana school districts. According to The Indianapolis Star, certain Indiana counties have developed different definitions of the law enforcement costs that are factored into the application of Indiana Code section 34-24-1-4. One county has purportedly taken the position that law enforcement costs include the overall costs of law enforcement, with the result that the costs of law enforcement always exceed the proceeds of forfeiture actions and nothing need be paid into the common school fund.

The complaint alleges that from August 29, 2008 to July 19, 2010, 92 Indiana counties paid only $95,509.72 (out of an estimated $17 million) in forfeiture proceeds into the common school fund. If the suit is successful, the relator would be entitled to as much as 30% of any monies recovered.

Under the Indiana FCA, the Attorney General has the right to intervene and prosecute the action on behalf of the state. However, the Attorney General may also represent state prosecutors in any civil action relating to their jobs as prosecutors. A press release from the Indiana Attorney General’s Office reports that the Attorney General has chosen to defend the county prosecutors named in the action and another indicates that the Attorney General is working with the Indiana legislature to reform Indiana’s forfeiture law.